According to standard IO models, the parameters that characterize market demand (intercept, slope, and elasticity) and technology (the level of symmetric marginal costs) do not play any role in de…ning the sustainability of collusive behaviors in Bertrand oligopolies. This paper modi…es this counterintuitive result by showing that all of the aforementioned factors do indeed matter when prices are assumed to be discrete rather than continuous.
Introduction
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y Telephone : +39 011.6705287. Fax : +39 011.6705088. E-mail: andrea.gallice@carloalberto.org innovation and reduce the quality and the variety of products available on the market. Due to the importance of these negative e¤ects, the analysis of collusion has always attracted a great deal of attention. Additionally, important links have been established between the vast body of theoretical literature and the daily activity of antitrust authorities.
1
One key aspect in the study of collusion is the identi…cation of the factors that can facilitate or hinder sustainability of non-competitive behaviors over time. From a theoretical point of view, an analysis of such an issue is common in the context of Bertrand supergames (as introduced in Friedman, 1971) where …rms repeatedly compete and potentially collude on prices. In these models, collusion appears to be sustainable whenever …rms prefer the stream of collusive pro…ts rather than the short terms gains that would follow a deviation from the cartel.
In other words, collusive agreements hold if …rms are patient and discount the future at a rate that is not lower than a certain threshold. Previous results show that many factors can modify this threshold and thus facilitate or hinder the sustainability of collusive behaviors (for a review, see Ivaldi et al., 2003 or Motta, 2004 . Some of these factors are related to the supply side of the market. For instance, a high level of concentration in the industry, symmetry of the colluding …rms, and product homogeneity facilitate the survival of a cartel. Yet, other factors are related to the demand side of the market. For example, a positive demand shock hinders collusion as it increases the incentives to deviate and conquer the entire market (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) . In contrast, collusion is more easily sustainable if demand growth is prolonged because the incentives to start a price war decrease when collusive pro…ts increase over time (Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991) .
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These evolutions of market demand are usually modeled exogenously, i.e., by introducing a multiplicative factor that proportionally in ‡ates or de ‡ates the demand function "from the 1 For a recent and non-technical review of these issues see Porter (2005) . 2 Note that demand growth can also trigger future entry, which in turn hampers the sustainability of collusive agreements. See Vasconcelos (2008) for a detailed analysis of these two countervailing e¤ects in a Cournot framework.
outside". In fact, the alternative strategy of modifying the internal parameters of the function would produce no e¤ects whatsoever. This is a standard result of these models; i.e., the parameters that de…ne the shape of market demand (the slope, the intercept, and the elasticity) and the level of symmetric marginal costs 3 while obviously a¤ecting the pro…tability of collusion do not play any role in de…ning its sustainability. Therefore, collusive behaviors appear to be equally sustainable in two hypothetical markets where, everything else being equal, the demand function in market A is k times steeper than the demand function in market B or the marginal costs in market A are, say, 5% of the costs that …rms in market B face.
Yet, this counterintuitive result is driven by the assumption that prices are continuous.
With such an assumption, all of the aforementioned parameters similarly a¤ect both the long term collusive pro…ts and the short term gains from undercutting rivals. As a consequence, they disappear from the constraint that de…nes the incentives that sustain collusion. However, this paper shows that this result does not hold (i.e., demand characteristics and the level of symmetric costs do have an e¤ect on the sustainability of collusion) if prices are assumed to be discrete rather than continuous.
The possibility of discrete prices is often mentioned in the discussion of Bertrand models, but the implications of such an assumption are usually studied under the conditions of perfect competition, i.e., as prices approach the lower bound of the admissible price interval. For instance, a typical textbook exercise may ask students to study how the standard Bertrand equilibrium (i.e., price equals marginal cost and zero pro…ts) changes when prices are discrete and the condition p = c is not feasible. 4 On the other hand, no studies have considered the implications of discrete prices in a non-competitive environment, i.e., when prices stabilize at a much higher level with respect to marginal cost. This paper investigates this issue.
Still, before moving to a proper analysis of the model, we must brie ‡y discuss a few reasons that justify the assumption of discrete prices. First of all, prices are indeed discrete in reality due to the minimum unit of measurement used in determining prices (e.g., one cent for goods priced in Dollars or Euros). However, the actual minimum monetary unit is often wider than that. In some markets (e.g., the …nancial sector, regulated markets, and some kinds of auctions), a larger monetary unit can be legally enforced as the minimum. In others, social conventions aimed at reducing transaction costs can a¤ect the minimum price di¤erence; therefore, houses are traded in thousands of dollars, cars in hundreds, and nightly hotel stays in dollars.
Moreover, price competition appears to work through considerable price jumps even in markets where search costs should be negligible. For instance, Baye et al. (2004) showed that the di¤erence between the two lowest prices for homogeneous electronic products sold over the Internet through a price comparison site ranges between 3.5% and 22%. Finally, the last evidence that points in the direction of discrete prices is implicitly rooted in the Bertrand model itself. The model is built on the assumption that a …rm that undercuts its rivals conquers the entire market. However, for this to be true, the deviating …rm's price must indeed be di¤erent from the price set by the rivals. According to economic and psychological literature about …nite sensibility, just perceptible di¤erences, and the various heuristics that consumers adopt, this di¤erence must be su¢ ciently large to be noticed and appreciated.
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In summary, this paper studies a Bertrand supergame of price competition and …nds that the parameters that de…ne market demand and the level of symmetric marginal costs do indeed a¤ect the sustainability of collusion when prices are assumed to be discrete rather than continuous. The analysis shows that the direction of these e¤ects is clear but their importance varies greatly, i.e., in some situations, it is totally negligible, while in others, it can be quite relevant and radically modify the incentives that sustain collusive behaviors.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 introduces the general framework. A more speci…c analysis is then undertaken for two di¤erent settings i.e., the case of a market characterized by linear demand (Section 3) and the case of a market characterized by constant elasticity demand (Section 4). Section 5 concludes the paper.
The framework
We consider an oligopoly where N …rms produce and sell a homogeneous good. Firms are perfectly symmetrical with marginal cost c 0, discount rate 2 [0; 1], no …xed costs, and no capacity constraints. Market demand is given by Q(p). Firms compete on prices (Bertrand competition) such that the individual demand for …rm i 2 N is given by:
In a one-time interaction, collusion cannot arise because the incentives to undercut rivals drive prices down to the marginal cost. Still, in an in…nite repetition of the one-shot game, …rms may pro…t from setting and maintaining a common price that is higher than the marginal cost. In what follows, we assume that through tacit or explicit agreements, …rms are able to coordinate a price that maximizes industry pro…ts, namely, the monopoly price p m . 6 This price solves max p = (p c)Q(p) and leads to total pro…ts m . Because of symmetry, the per-period collusive pro…ts for each …rm are then given by m = 1 N m .
Collusion is sustainable if no …rm has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from p m . For this to be true, the stream of pro…ts that follows a deviation must be smaller than the stream of collusive pro…ts. Such a condition is formally captured by the following constraint:
The term d , where d stands for deviation, indicates the one-period pro…ts of a deviating …rm while p , where p stands for punishment, refers to the …rm's pro…ts once competitors react to the initial deviation.
A deviating …rm slightly undercuts the collusive price p m . In the standard analysis with continuous prices, the size of this undercut is assumed to be negligible ( ' 0) such that the deviator is basically able to fully realize the monopoly pro…ts ( d = m ). In this paper, due to the reasons mentioned in the introduction, the minimal price undercut is assumed to be small but strictly positive ( > 0).
For what concerns p , we let …rms adopt trigger strategies that punish deviations in the harshest possible way (see, for instance, Porter, 1983) . More precisely, …rms react to a deviation by reverting to the one-shot Nash equilibrium such that p = c and p = 0 in any future period. Using this result and the fact that
, the constraint (1) can be solved for , resulting in the following:
According to this expression, collusion is sustainable if the …rms'discount rate is not smaller than a certain threshold de…ned by . In other words, …rms must be su¢ ciently patient and put adequate weight on future collusive pro…ts rather than on short term gains that stem from breaking the cartel.
7 Technically speaking, the assumption of discrete prices implies that the demand function is also discrete. We claim that for small the price grid is dense enough such that the actual demand function can be smoothed into a well-behaved continuous function. As such, in what follows we keep using ordinary di¤erentiation techniques and we implicitly assume that the optimal solution pm is feasible, i.e., it belongs to the price grid.
Discrete prices with linear demand
Assume that market demand is captured by the linear function Q(p) = a bp with both a and b positive. Individual demand for …rm i is given by: .
Notice that a necessary condition for a …rm to consider the possibility of deviating is that
. This is veri…ed if and only if < a bc 2b , which we assume from now on.
By substituting d and m = N m in the incentive constraint (2), one obtains that collusion is sustainable if:
This expression clearly shows two related results. First, if = 0 (continuous prices), the constraint simpli…es to the standard one = 1
1 N and the characteristics of market demand (the parameters a and b) and technology (the parameter c) do not in ‡uence the sustainability of collusion. Second, with > 0, a mismatch occurs between the numerator and the denominator of the ratio; collusive pro…ts and short term gains from deviations di¤er and do not cancel out any more. This implies that changes in a, b, or c impact the sustainability of the cartel because they change , i.e., the critical discount rate below which collusion breaks
In general, notice that the mismatch between the numerator and the denominator is in-creasing in . Therefore, the higher is the lower is and non-competitive agreements are more easily sustainable. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. A large moves the price set by a deviating …rm away from the monopoly price. This implies that the pro…ts of a deviator are substantially lower than the stream of collusive pro…ts. It follows that …rms are willing to break the cartel only if they are very impatient (low ). At the same time, a large brings the price set by the deviating …rm near to the competitive price p = c. As such, and conditional on a deviation taking place, consumer surplus is increasing in .
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To sum up, a large price tick make deviations from a cartel less attractive for …rms but more bene…cial for consumers. Nevertheless, our main interest is to study how condition (3) is a¤ected by changes in the values of a, b, or c when the price tick is small. In what follows we assume a that is on the order of 1-2% of the monopoly price.
Marginal e¤ects and their magnitude
Starting from the constraint de…ned by (3), computing the marginal e¤ects that the parameters a (i.e., the vertical intercept of the demand function), b (i.e., the slope of the demand function) and c (i.e., the level of symmetric marginal costs) have on is easy. These are as follows:
8 Formally, consumer surplus at the collusive equilibrium is given by csm = In a standard (q; p) diagram, an increase in b not only lowers the vertical intercept but also makes the demand curve ‡atter. In order to disentangle the possibly con ‡icting contributions of these two e¤ects, we plug the parameters of the inverse demand (b = 1 and a = b = ) in (3), and we study how changes in a¤ect the new constraint.
The parameter cancels out and does not appear in (7). Therefore the e¤ects of b on work through the changes that b causes in the intercept and not on the slope . 10 In a (q; p)
diagram, a lower b implies a higher vertical intercept, i.e., a larger demand for any given price.
As in the case of the parameter a, a market expansion makes collusion less sustainable. . Obviously an increase in a implies a positive demand shock also under this formulation.
1 0 Alternatively, equation (5) can be formulated as is as in (4). This expression again shows that the e¤ects of b on are channeled through the changes that b causes on . 1 1 This result is in line with the classical contribution by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) . Still notice that in our case the e¤ects on are triggered by endogenous variations of the demand and not by an exogenous shock.
The magnitude of the e¤ects of variations in a, b, and c on the degree of sustainability of collusion varies greatly. A common pattern is that these e¤ects are small and possibly negligible for a vast range of the domain. Yet, for certain con…gurations of the parameters, these e¤ects can be huge. This is due to the fact that the three marginal e¤ects (4), (5), and (6) 
Discrete prices with constant elasticity demand
The elasticity of market demand is often mentioned as a factor that may a¤ect the sustainability of collusion. Nevertheless, the formal analysis of its e¤ects remains a bit vague at least for the concerns within the framework of Bertrand competition. 13 Scholars have indicated that elasticity and the pro…tability of collusion are inversely related (see Ivaldi et al., 2003 or Motta, 2004 ). 14 From this perspective, elasticity surely has an indirect e¤ect on cartel stability. In fact, low elasticity makes collusion more pro…table such that …rms are more likely to try to implement and maintain non-competitive behaviors. Nevertheless, the standard analysis does not …nd any direct e¤ect from elasticity on the sustainability of collusion. The reason again lies in the fact that under the assumption of continuous prices the characteristics of the demand function do not a¤ect the critical discount factor above which collusive agreements become sustainable.
In this section, we study the role of demand elasticity when prices are discrete. An ideal framework for analyzing such an issue is provided by demand functions that are characterized by a constant elasticity. The general form for such a function is given by Q(p) = ap where is the parameter that captures elasticity. For the sake of tractability, in what follows we set a = 1. As before, …rms are assumed to be perfectly symmetric with marginal cost c > 0, discount rate , no …xed costs, and no capacity constraints. Competition on prices is such that generic …rm i faces the following demand function:
The collusive monopoly price is given by p m = . Again, we impose the condition p d > c which is ful…lled by < c+ . According to the incentive constraint (2), collusion is then sustainable if the following condition holds:
This is quite a complicated function (notice the discontinuity at = c+ ) and its …rst derivative with respect to is too cumbersome to be discussed. In order to have a feeling for the sign and the magnitude of the e¤ects of on we thus rely on a numerical example. Figure   2 reports the case with N = 2, c = 0:1, = 0:01 and 2 (1; 11). The graph shows that is initially a strictly decreasing function of such that collusion becomes more easily sustainable as elasticity increases (in absolute value). Then, an area exists in which the actual would be negative such that it is constrained to = 0, thereby making collusion always sustainable.
The …nding that the sustainability of collusion increases with the elasticity of demand is consistent with the numerical results that Collie (2004) provides for what concerns Cournot oligopolies. At …rst sight, such a result may seem surprising. In fact, one may imagine that a …rm that operates in a more elastic market has higher incentives to deviate as, given any price tick , the …rm would conquer a larger market share. Nevertheless, such an argument does not apply in our Bertrand framework with homogeneous goods. In fact, Bertrand competition implies that a deviating …rm conquers all the market no matter the elasticity of demand.
Moreover, the absence of substitute goods prevents consumers to divert their demand to other markets.
On the contrary, we agree with Collie (2004) and we think that the positive relation between the sustainability of collusion and the elasticity of demand is triggered by the e¤ects that elasticity has on the price-cost margin. More precisely, a higher elasticity leads to a lower monopoly price and thus to a lower margin over marginal costs. This in turn implies that the one-o¤ pro…ts stemming from a deviation are limited as a deviating …rm must set a price that is even closer to marginal costs and thus exploit an even lower margin. Therefore, only a very impatient …rm (low ) would break the cartel.
Conclusions
This paper analyzed the sustainability of collusion in Bertrand supergames under the assumption of discrete prices rather than continuous prices. In particular, the analysis highlighted the e¤ects that previously neglected factors, like the characteristics of market demand and the symmetric level of marginal costs, may create in terms of shaping the incentives that sustain a cartel.
Notice that some of the results within this paper could be tested against the data. For instance, the model implies that the degree of sustainability of collusive behaviors is an increasing function of the price tick . For European countries, an important exogenous variation of was caused by the introduction of the Euro in January 2002. For example, increased by a factor of around 6.5 for goods previously priced in French Francs, while it increased by a factor of almost 20 for goods priced in Italian Liras. In markets characterized by high volumes and low unitary price (e.g., some raw materials), these variations may have had an actual impact on the sustainability of non competitive behaviors.
